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Abstract
This paper brings together and adds structure to the empirical literature on the link
between banking regulation and banking system stability. In addition to clarifying the
theoretical underpinnings for studying banking regulation, it points to several directions
for future empirical research, necessary to ll the gaps in our understanding of the
link between banking regulation and stability. The paper starts with a review of the
literature on the design of banking regulation and its link with stability, followed by an
assessment of the most common methodologies used in this literature.The paper then
reviews the empirical literature of various banking regulations. This is followed by a
proposal on the new directions for research of the link between banking regulation and
banking system stability.
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1 Introduction
Banking is one of the most regulated and monitored industries in the world. In fact, there
exist no less than eight types of banking regulation.1 Two main reasons have been pointed
out to explain why this is the case. Firstly, is the perception of banks as fragile institutions
that need the help of government to evolve in a sound and safe environment; and secondly,
banking instability is costly to the entire economy as a result of the key role banks play in
nancial intermediation by providing liquidity insurance, monitoring services, and providing
economic and nancial information.
Generally, governments delegate their regulatory power to Central Banks, which organize
the regulatory system given their role of the lender of last resort. However, this has not
always been the case (see, e.g., Allen and Herring (2001)). In fact, Central Banks were
initially founded for di¤erent purposes. It is only in the nineteenth century that the focus
of Central Banks shifted towards nancial stability and their role increasingly came to be to
eliminate crises. Moreover, the experience of bank panics during the Great Depression had
a profound e¤ect on bank regulation in the US. and in almost all countries in the world. As
a result banks became heavily regulated in every country. Furthermore, in some countries
the government intervened directly in the nancial system to allocate resources. Interest
rates were strictly controlled and systemic risk was avoided. Financial stabilization became
the objective of banking regulation.
The costs of banking crises were perceived to be so high that they had to be avoided at
all costs. Even though intensive regulations were able to eliminate systemic risk associated
with banks in the post war period, over time it became increasingly less obvious that heavily
regulated banking were optimal. This led to a worldwide wave of nancial liberalization.
Unfortunately, it also led to the return of nancial crises. More importantly, it induced a
new generation of regulations.
Since the re-introduction of nancial liberalization in the 1980s, new types of regula-
tion have emerged, the most important being the Basel Accords with its capital adequacy
requirement and its supervision practices. We also noticed the decline of the level of the re-
serve requirement, the adoption or the redesign of deposits insurance, and the emergence of
banking examination and supervision in a great number of economies. This new regulatory
framework has been praised for the international convergence of banksrisk management
standards and for the improvement of these standards in many economies. Their design
and implementation have been blamed for increasing several market failures in the banking
1 see, e.g., Mishkin (2000), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), and Allen and Herring (2001)
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industry. For example Brimmer (1992) argued that:
Contrary to expectations,(...) the banking bill which became law in December 1991,
will most likely undermine the stability and the e¢ ciency of the banking system in coming
years. In the mistaken belief that it was helping to enhance the safety and soundness of
individual banks and simultaneously protecting Federal insurance funds Congress actually
established an inexible regulatory regime which will cut back on the scope of the nancial
activities in which banks can engage, increase the level and costs of capital requirements,
make the money market less e¢ cient, and involve regulators much more extensively in the
internal a¤airs of banking institutions.
Existing banking regulations can be grouped into three broad categories: regulatory
measures a¤ecting the banks balance sheet (capital adequacy requirements, reserve re-
quirements, and asset holding restrictions), regulatory measures a¤ecting the structure of
the banking system (separation of the banking and other nancial industries like securities,
insurance, or real estate (e.g., the Glass-Steagall act of 1933); restrictions on competition),
and regulatory measures for banks owners and managers behavior (risk-based deposit
insurance premiums, disclosure requirements, bank chartering, and bank examination).
Despite the recent progress in the research on banking fragility, there is still no consensus
on how best to design and implement banking regulation in this new context of free banking.
According to Santos (2001), this is the result of our lack of understanding of the mechanisms
between banking regulation and market failure, and also the interaction of these regulations
among them. It is also a consequence of our limited understanding of the implications of
those regulations in a general equilibrium framework.
Notwithstanding of these limitations, the research already undertaken has produced
some important results, specically on the link between the type of banking regulation and
banking system stability. This paper contributes to this literature by bringing together and
adding structure to the contemporary theoretical and empirical literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical
review of the link between regulation and banking stability. Section 3 reviews the design
of banking regulations. Section 4 assesses the existing methodologies used in the literature.
Section 5 reviews the empirical literature of various types of banking regulation. Section 6
presents a proposal for new directions of research on the link between banking regulation
and banking system stability, and concludes.
Before proceeding, we should mention several important topics closely related to banking
regulation that our article does not deal with, as well as some of the references to these
topics. Specically, our study does not deal with the link between regulation, banking
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protability, and/or nancial development (see, e.g., Bath, Caprio, and Levine (2004)). It
also does not deal with the link between regulation and bank governance (see, e.g., Beck,
Demirguç-Kunt, and Levine (2006b)). The last preliminary point is on the selection of
countries that we talk about. Most of the available empirical evidence comes from the
United States and the group of ten member countries of the Basel committee. One reason
for this is the fact that data are generally more easily available for these economies than
for others, and another is that a great number of economic researchers is located in these
countries.
2 Reviewing the Link Between Regulations and BanksSta-
bility
In the introduction we argued that one of the key rationales for banking regulation is the
prevention of banking crises. Hence, we start our paper with a brief review of the sources
of banking instability, and the channels through which regulations can prevent it.
There are two main reasons for banks failure. A bank can fail because the assets it
owns or the credit it has made, have realized an unexpected low return such that the bank
no longer has the resources to pay back depositors. A bank can also fail if a sudden rush of
withdrawals forces it to sell o¤ assets at a very low price. Let us start with the latter.
A nancial crisis can be initiated by a sudden rush of withdrawals; hereafter, a run
on a bank. This sudden rush is generally a result of a coordination failure among the
banks depositors. In fact, banks are characterized by balance sheets where banksliabilities
(deposits) are generally short-term, while their assets are long-term and illiquid. A run on a
bank occurs when the banks demand for withdrawals by depositors exceeds the short-term
value of its assets.
Many reasons have been given in the literature as the trigger of bank runs. The most
important is an arbitrary shift in expectations generally called sunspot; see, e.g., Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). Another trigger is a shift in expectations due to the release of "bad
news" (see, e.g., Morris and Shin (1998, 2000), Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), Chari and
Jagannathan (1988)). Finally a productivity shock can trigger a bank run (e.g., Diamond
and Rajan (2001a, 2001b), and Chen (1999) and Dasgupta (2000)).
But even if coordination failure can cause the failure of a bank, we need a linkage
between banks in the form of information spillovers or credit exposures to turn a bank run
into a systemic banking crisis, see e.g., Allen and Gale (2000a); Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet
(2000).
The coordination failure problem in banking is a type of market failure, which can be
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solved by a proper identication of unnecessary withdrawals, suspension of withdrawals,
and/or the institution of deposit guarantee, which can give incentive to depositors not to
join the rush even if others are rushing.
The information spillovers market failure can be mitigated by markets transparency,
which helps to reduce information asymmetry and gives condence to the other banks
depositors not to join the run occurring in the neighbour bank. Moreover, e¢ cient lender-
of-last-resort operations by the Central Bank can provide liquidity into the banking system
and mitigate the negative e¤ect of credit exposure and reduce the risk of contagion, see,
e.g., Allen and Gale (2000).
A banking crisis can also be initiated by a high level of unexpected non-performing loans
in a bank. When this information is known by the depositors, they rush to the bank to
get back their deposits before the other depositors. If markets for liquidity are ine¢ cient
because of market power or information asymmetries, liquidity problems at healthy banks
can turn into solvency problems. In fact, in this case the bank is forced to sell its long-term
assets below their fair value, see, e.g., Allen and Gale (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1989,
1990), Donaldson (1992), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
In order to mitigate the risk due to non-performing loans, banks can choose to hold an
important proportion of their portfolio in safe assets. Regulators can help them to do so by
increasing the required capital ratio. Another channel which can be used to mitigate this
type of risk is the increase of competition among banks so as to reduce their market power
and provide them with an incentive to organize e¢ ciently the interbank lending market.2
3 Review of the Design of Banking Regulation
According to Allen and Herring (2001), there are 16 types of banking regulation.There
are broadly four goals for these regulations, namely: preventing systemic risk, providing
protection for investors, enhancing e¢ ciency, and improving the social welfare. None of the
regulations can achieve all of these objectives. Given our interest in banking stability we
focus only on regulations put in place to prevent systemic risk. According to this paper
there are eight types of regulation which help to achieve stability. These regulations are: (i)
the asset restrictions; (ii) the capital adequacy requirement; (iii) the deposit insurance, (iv)
the t and proper entry tests; (v) the interest rate ceilings on deposits, (vi) the liquidity
requirement; (vii) the reserve requirements; (viii) the restrictions on services and product
lines.
2For a detailed review of the theoretical literature on banking instability see Lai (2002).
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Other studies have also focused on the design of the banking system regulation around
the world. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) provide an extensive assessment of the existing
regulation and supervision.3 Mishkin (2000) provides a list of eight types of regulation.4
Although these studies do not report the same regulations, they do report many in common.
For a structured presentation of the design of banking regulation let us organize the
presentation around the three groups that we presented above.
3.1 Regulations A¤ecting Banks Balance Sheet
Among the regulatory measures presented by the above three studies, three measures are
aimed at a¤ecting the banks balance sheet: restrictions on asset holdings, capital adequacy
requirements, and reserve and/or liquidity requirements.
a) Restrictions on asset holdings aim at reducing the proportion of some type of risky
assets in the portfolios of banks. It is then a constraint on the asset side of the banks balance
sheet. Its theoretical justication is based on the presence of information asymmetries
between depositors and the bank manager, which can lead the manager to take too much
risk without being disciplined by the withdrawal of deposits. It is a regulation, which has
been adopted by many countries around the world. However, ndings of Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2004) show that the level of restriction is higher in lower-income countries than in
higher-income countries.
b) Capital adequacy requirements ask bank managers and/or owners to keep, in the
form of equities, a given proportion of the amount of the risky loans that they have made.
It has a direct e¤ect on the composition of the liability size of a banks balance sheet. More
importantly, it aims at providing incentives for banks to hold less risky portfolios. In fact,
this regulation can reduce their incentive to provide too many risky loans since in the case
of a failure they may lose all their equities, and if their amount of equity is important, it
means that they will lose a lot.
There are many types of capital adequacy requirement; their design has also evolved over
time. According to Mishkin (2000) bank capital requirements typically take three forms:
(i) the rst type is based on the so-called leverage ratio, which is the amount of capital
3From Barth, Caprio, and Levine (1998) there are 12 basic types of banking regulation: (i) entry into
banking, (ii) ownership, (iii) capital, (iv) activities, (v) external auditing requirements, (vi) internal man-
agements/organizational requirements, (vii) liquidity and diversication requirements, (viii) the deposit
requirements, (ix) the accounting /information disclosure requirements, (x) the discipline/problem institu-
tions/exit, and (xi) supervision.
4The eight basic regulatory measures pointed out by Mishkin (2000) are: (i) restrictions on asset holdings
and activities, (ii) separation of the banking and other nancial industries like securities, insurance, or real
estate, (iii) restrictions on competition, (iv) capital requirements, (v) risk-based deposit insurance premiums,
(vi) disclosure requirements, (vii) bank chartering, and (viii) bank examination.
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divided by the banks total assets; (ii) the Basel I Accord type where assets and o¤-balance
sheet activities are allocated into four categories, each with a di¤erent weight to reect the
degree of credit risk; (iii) the third type is the capital requirement based on the level of
market risk taken by banks.
Given the importance of the capital adequacy requirement in the regulatory framework
of almost every country in the world today, we found useful to present some insight about
the design of the capital adequacy requirement as stated by the Basel II Accord. The risk-
weighted capital adequacy requirement is based on the concept of the capital ratio where
the numerator represents the amount of capital a bank has available and the denominator
is a measure of the risks faced by the bank and is referred to as risk-weighted assets. The
resulting capital ratio may be no less than eight percent. The assessment of the risk-weighted
assets taken by a bank depends heavily on the technique used to measure it. The Basel II
accord species the technique that should be used to assess each type of risk. Let us recall
that the Basel committee identied three types of risk in the banking industry: credit risk,
market risk, and operational risk.
To measure the credit risk the bank can use three approaches: the standardized ap-
proach, the foundation internal ratings based (IRB) approach, and the advanced IRB
approach: (i) the standardized approach uses only a predetermined risk weight for di¤er-
ent types of loans; (ii) the model underlying the internal ratings based approach is the
one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default.5
To assess the market risk, Basel II accord proposed the V aR. The market risk capital
requirement for banks when they use the internal model-based approach is calculated at
any given time as k  V aR+ SRC, where k is a multiplicative factor and SRC is a specic
risk charge. The value at risk, V aR, is the greater of the previous days value at risk and
the average value at risk over the last 60 days. The minimum value of k is 3.
In addition to improving the way banks calculate credit risk capital, Basel II required
banks to keep capital for operational risk. The regulators o¤ered three approaches to
measure this: the basic indicator approach, the standardized approach, and the advanced
measurement approach. The basic indicator approach sets the operational risk capital equal
to the banks average annual gross income over the last three years multiplied by 0:15.
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the stringency of capital requirements
5More precisely, consider a large portfolio of N loans. Let us denote: WCDR: the worst-case default rate
during the next year that we are 99:9% certain will not be exceeded, PD: the probability of default for each
loan in one year, EAD: the exposure at default on each loan (in dollars), LGD: the loss given default, i.e., the
proportion of the exposure that is lost in the event of a default. Suppose that the copula correlation between




(1  )))]. It follows
that there is a 99:9% chance that the loss on the portfolio will be less than N times EADLGDWCDR:
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is lower for lower-income countries than for higher-income countries. The overall capital
stringency is lower in developing countries than in developed countries.
c) Reserve and/or liquidity requirements are a form of regulation which forces banks
to maintain, in the form of a reserve, a given proportion of their deposits in an account
of the Central Bank, and/or to maintain, in the form of liquidity, a given proportion of
deposits in their account. This type of regulation a¤ects the composition of the asset size
of the banks balance sheet. This regulation can mitigate the incentive of a banks owner
and manager to get involved in too risky activities. Besides, the reserve requirement is
probably one of the most ancient types of banking regulation. It has been viewed as a
form of taxation on banks by governments, since generally these required reserves do not
bear interest. Many US economists have argued that a reserve requirement was needed in
the US because of the existence of a deposit insurance run by the government. But this
is no longer the view of a lot of Central Bank economists in developed economies. In fact,
in the 1990s some countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have abandoned the
use of this required reserve and even countries which have not removed it, have reduced it
substantially and more frequently. Meanwhile, in developing countries the reserve and/or
liquidity requirement is still used. Some countries have signicantly reduced their reserve
requirement and increased the liquidity requirement. More than four-fth of the countries
still maintain a reserve requirement and about one-eighth of the countries has a liquidity
requirement.
3.2 Regulations A¤ecting the Banking Sector Structure
Some regulations have an important impact on the structure of the banking system in a
given country. From the previous example of regulations the following can have a signicant
inuence on bank structure: regulations separating banking and non-banking business, and
restrictions on entry in the banking industry.
a) Regulations separating banking and non-banking business: some governments restrict
banks from involvment in commercial activities, which are considered to be outside the core
banking business and, therefore, may be more risky. In the United States there was an
even more restrictive policy, which was under application during the period 1933-2003:
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.6 We observed from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004)
survey that almost every country (except New-Zealand) has at least a restriction on banks
involvement in activities such as: securities, insurance, real estate, and a bank owning non-
6The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 forces banks to be separated from other nancial industries such as
securities, insurance or real estate.
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nancial rms. They also found that restrictions imposed on bank activities are greater
for lower-income countries than higher-income countries; and that government ownership
of banks increases in countries, on average, as one moves from the higher-income level to
the lower-income level.
b) Regulation on entry into the banking industry: there are many types of restrictions to
the entry into the industry. It ranges from the minimum amount of capital that the owner
should provide to the regulatory agencies, to the restriction of foreigners to own or invest
in banks. If the goal of the minimum amount of capital needed to enter into the banking
sector is mainly to limit competition, the goal of restricting foreign funds is three-fold: to
limit competition, to reduce the exposure to capital ight, and to reduce the exchange-rate
risk. From Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) almost every country has a minimum amount
of capital to obtain a licence or a charter for banking activities. Although the entry of
foreign funds was prohibited for acquisition, subsidiary, and creation of a branch during
the 1980s, according to Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) almost no banking system is now
restricting foreign funds to invest in banking. Meanwhile, they found that the percentage of
entry applications denied is greater for low-income countries than for high-income countries;
and that developing countries place more limitations on foreign bank ownership of domestic
banks and foreign bank entry through branching than developed countries.
3.3 Regulations A¤ecting the Managersand/or OwnersBehavior
Since the theoretical literature has pointed out many market failures which can lead man-
agers to take too much risk or to take improper actions without being disciplined by a free
well-functioning nancial market, many regulations have been designed to deal with this
issue: the risk-based deposit insurance, disclosure requirements, bank chartering, and bank
examination.
a) Deposit insurance was rst introduced in the US after the Great Depression and
has since been adopted by many countries. In their survey of 2001 Barth, Caprio, and
Levine observed that at least 77 countries were applying it while Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane,
and Laeven (2006) found that 87 countries were applying it by the end of 2003. Its aim is
to reduce the likelihood of bank runs and panics in the banking system. However, complete
insurance is likely to introduce moral hazard into the banking system and therefore increase
its fragility. That is why a new type of deposit insurance has emerged, namely risk-based
deposit insurance premiums. If the deposit insurance premium, provided by the government,
is priced appropriately to reect the amount of risk taken by a bank, it will solve the moral
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hazard issue.7 Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that developing countries are almost
three times as likely as developed countries not to have an explicit deposit insurance scheme.
b) Disclosure requirements aim at mitigating the asymmetry of information available in
the banking industry. Generally, regulators require that banks adhere to certain standard
accounting principles and disclose a wide range of information that helps the market assess
the quality of a banks portfolio and the degree of the banks exposure to risk. This type
of regulation is widely used by high-income countries and less by developing countries. For
example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) point out that the percentage of banks rated
by international credit rating agencies is seven times greater for high-income countries as
compared to low-income countries.
c) Bank chartering aims at preventing dishonest people and overly ambitious entrepre-
neurs from engaging in highly speculative activities. In fact, chartering proposal for new
banks are screened to prevent dishonest and speculative people from controlling banks.
Almost every country has this type of regulation.
d) Bank examination, or supervision, or monitoring helps to limit moral hazard incen-
tives for excessive risk taking. Since it is not enough to have regulations which encourage
less risk taking, banks must be monitored to see if they are complying with these regula-
tions. This type of regulation improves the quality of the nancial information given to the
public by bank owners and managers and can also serve to enforce the existing regulations.
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found that the degree of private monitoring increases
as one compares lower-income countries to higher-income countries and that the tenure of
supervisors is less in developing countries than in developed countries.
4 Review of Empirical Methodologies
The empirical analysis of the link between regulation and stability of the banking system
had so far taken two main directions. The rst direction is to compute, using a measure
of risk assessment, the risk taken by the banks during a period under which a given type
of regulation was under implementation and to see if the dynamic of the risk is associated
with the given regulation. We will refer to this method as the implicit-risk method. This
method is generally applied on bank-level data in a given economy or on bank-level data of
a group of economies.
The second direction is to talk about banking fragility in a given economy. The risk
measure here takes the form of a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a banking
7Risk-based deposit insurance premiums are theoretically appealing but in practice they have not worked
very well mainly because it is hard to accurately determine the amount of risk a bank is actually taking
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system is assumed to be in a systemic banking crisis situation during a given year, and
0 if not. Under this method cross-country data and discrete regression model are widely
employed.
4.1 Implicit Risk Method
A least three classes of econometric models use the implicit measure of risk to assess the
impact of regulation on banking stability. These classes are: the simultaneous equation
model, which is generally used to study the impact of capital adequacy requirement on
banks risk, the discrete regression model which is mainly used in studies using the rate
recorded by credit rating agencies, and the survival and hazard models used to model the
probability of a banks failure.
4.1.1 Simultaneous Equation Model
The simultaneous equation model was introduced by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to analyze
adjustments in capital ratio and risk following the imposition of capital adequacy require-
ment in the US banking system.8 The key ingredient of this model is that observed changes
in bank capital ratios and portfolio risk levels can be decomposed into two components,
a discretionary adjustment, and a change caused by an exogenously determined random





where CAPjt and RISKjt are observed changes in capital ratios and risk levels for bank
j in period t, dCAP and dRISK represent discretionary adjustments in capital ratios
and risk levels, and E and U are exogenous shocks. Recognizing that banks may not be
able to adjust their desired capital ratios and risk levels instantaneously, the discretionary
changes in capital and risk are modeled using a partial adjustment framework.
CAPjt = (CAP

jt   CAPj;t 1) + Ejt
RISKjt = (RISK

jt  RISKj;t 1) + Ujt
Thus, observed changes in bank capital ratios and portfolio risk in period t are functions
of the target capital ratio CAP jt and target risk level RISK

jt, the lagged capital ratio
CAPt 1 and risk levels RISKt 1 and any random shocks.
The target capital ratio level is not observable, but is assumed to depend upon some
set of observable variables, including the changes in portfolio risk (RISKjt), while the
exogenous shock that could a¤ect bank capital ratios is the regulatory pressure. Also, the
8 It has since then been used by a great number of authors e.g., Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime (2000),
and Nachane et al. (2000).
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target risk level is not observable, but is assumed to depend on a set of observable variables
including the changes in portfolio risk (CAPjt), while the exogenous shock that could
a¤ect bank capital ratios is the regulatory pressure. This assumption helps to recognize the
possible simultaneous relationship between capital and risk.9
To complete the empirical estimation of the simultaneous equation system one must
provide a measure of the bank capital and a measure of the portfolio risk of banks. In
the literature, portfolio risk is measured in two ways: using the ratio of total risk weighted
assets to total assets, and using the gross non-performing loans as percentage of total assets
(see, e.g., Avery and Berger (1991), Berger (1995), and Shrieves and Dahl (1992)). The
literature also uses two denitions of a banks capital ratio: the ratio of capital to total
assets (see, e.g. Shrieves and Dahl (1992), and the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
(see, e.g. Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and Ediz et al. (1998)).
In this literature also, the regulatory pressure is a cornerstone of the hypotheses involving
minimum capital standards; hence, it should be captured. Generally, the regulation pressure
(REG) is a binary variable.
Let us denote by OTHERS the other variables a¤ecting the banking capital and the
banks risk. The model can be broadly set as
CAPjt = 0 + 1REGjt + 2OTHERSjt + 3RISKjt + 4CAPjt 1 + ujt
RISKjt = 0 + 1REGjt + 2OTHERSjt + 3CAPjt + 4RISKjt 1 + vjt
where ujt and vjt are error terms. This model is generally estimated using a two or a three-
stage least-square procedure. Authors using the three-stage method argue that it allows
them to take into account the simultaneity of banksadjustments in capital and risk and to
get estimates that are asymptotically more e¢ cient than under the two-stage technique.
4.1.2 Methodology with the Credit Rating
Some authors working on bank level data use the rate of commercial banks provided by
the international rating risk agencies as their measure of risk. Typically these agencies rate
banksnancial strength on a N point scale, ranging from E to A+. Since these rates form
a limited dependent variable, the appropriate econometric model used to assess the impact
of regulation on the banking system stability here is an ordered probit or logit. Specically,
the regression equation estimated is:
RATij = 0 + 1REGj + 2BKCij + 3INSj + 4MEVj + uij
9Shrieves and Dahl (1992) argued that a positive relationship between changes in capital and risk may
signify, among other possibilities, the unintended impact of minimum regulatory capital requirements or
even managerial risk aversion. Jacques and Nigro (1997) argued that a negative relationship may result
because of methodological aws in the capital standards.
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where the subscript i denotes the country and the subscript j denotes the bank; with RAT
for rating, REG for regulation, BKC for banking characteristics, INS for institutions,
MEV for macroeconomic variables.10
4.1.3 Survival Model
Some authors use the probability of bank failure as their measure of risk or fragility. They
then study the impact of regulation on this probability of failure. In the literature survival
econometric model of Kaplan-Meier is generally used.11
4.2 Explicit-Instability Method
So far in the literature, we have reported two econometric methodologies used to study the
link between banking regulation and banking instability when the dependent variable is the
explicit dummy variable of banking crisis. The most frequent one is the Demirguç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998), hereafter DKD98 method, which consists of using a discrete regression
model in the context of panel data. More precisely, DKD98 built a model similar to this:
Let P it denotes an unobservable variable representing the probability that the banking
system of country i su¤ers a systemic crisis at time t, and Pit - a dummy variable which
takes the value 1 when country i su¤ers a systemic banking crisis at time t and 0 otherwise.
The probability of a systemic banking crisis is modelled as follows:
Pit = 1 if P

it > C




P it = 
0Xit + "it
and where Xit represents the matrix of all exogenous variables; i the country index; t the
time index, and C a threshold value of the banking crisis probability.
The impact of each regulation on the banking system stability can be assessed by aug-
menting the above benchmark model of banking crises with variables capturing some charac-
teristics of the banking regulation. Let us denote by Lit the matrix of variables representing
the regulatory measures in country i at time t. The reduced form equation can be given by
P it = 
0Xit + 0Lit + "it:
If  is signicant and negative, then regulation reduces the probability of the banking system
being in a systemic crisis.
10See Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2006) for more details.
11See, e.g., Erlend and Baumann (2006), and Sheldon (2006) for more details
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This model is estimated using the logit regression model in the context of panel data.
The sign of the estimated coe¢ cients for each exogenous variable shows how an increase of
that explanatory variable increases or decreases the probability of a crisis. However, as is
well known for a binary model, the estimated coe¢ cients cannot represent the magnitude of
the e¤ect of a marginal change in the exogenous variable on the likelihood of a banking crisis.
Each coe¢ cient instead reects the e¤ect of a change in a given explanatory variable on
ln(Pit=(1  Pit)); so that the magnitude of the e¤ect on the probability of a crisis depends
on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at 0Xit + 0Lit: it follows that the
magnitude of the change in the probability of a banking crisis depends on the initial values
of all the exogenous variables and their coe¢ cients. Hence, after the estimation of the
logit model, the following step is to compute the marginal coe¢ cient estimates which are
evaluated at the sample mean. These estimates represent the magnitude of the link between
each exogenous variable and the probability of a systemic banking crisis evaluated at the
sample mean.
The literature tends to use the logit instead of the panel-logit to estimate this model
because the former is always convergent and the latter may not be.
The second method consists of using the discrete regression model but in the context of
cross-section data. More precisely, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) use the cross-section
data over a ve-year period time. Their dependent variable, which is the dummy variable
for a crisis, is dened as follows: if a country has su¤ered a systemic banking crisis during
the ve-year period, the dummy variable takes on the value 1; if not it is 0. The regulatory
variables are taken from a survey, and the macroeconomic control variables are the average
of this variable over the ve-year period. They then use a simple logit model to assess the
impact of each regulatory measure on the banking instability.
5 Review of Empirical Studies
We will carry out our empirical review with respect to the above groups. Let us rst start
with the implicit-method.
5.1 Empirical Studies Using the Implicit-Risk Method
A great number of theoretical and empirical studies have been carried out on the impact
of the capital adequacy requirement on the banking stability or the risk-taking behavior of
bank managers in developed economies over the last decade. A lot of research has been
done on the US banking system. Generally, these works use individual bank-level data and
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compute a measure of risk taken by each bank. Let us rst present the work already done
for the US banking system before presenting the work for other economies.
5.1.1 Capital Standard and Stability in the US Banking System
The capital standard was rst introduced in the US banking system in 1981.12 Even before
the introduction of the Basel I accord on capital requirement, many theoretical studies have
been carried out on this regulation regarding the risk-taking behavior of bank owners and
managers. The most important studies were Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and
Santomero (1988). The message of this theoretical work was that capital standard may not
be e¤ective under various sets of conditions. Since then a lot of economists have carried out
empirical studies on the US banking system to test this theoretical conclusion.
The rst empirical work for the US banking system is the paper of Furlong (1988).
He used the data of 98 large US bank holding companies from 1975 to 1986. He dened
the risk taken by banks as the volatility of underlying asset values. He computed this by
inverting the call option pricing formula, and found that asset risk measured in this way
doubled during the period 1981-86 in the part of his sample in which banks were under
capital requirements, compared with the earlier period. However, banks which were well-
capitalized in 1981 before the introduction of capital requirement experienced the same rise
in volatility as those which were not. He then argued that these ndings do not support
the view that an increase in capital adequacy requirement leads banks to increase their
risky-assets.
As noted by Jackson et al. (1999), his interpretation is true only if one assumes that the
level of bank capital in 1981 was representing the desired or the equilibrium capital level. In
this case Furlongs ndings would be inconsistent with the Kim and Santomeros theoret-
ical ndings since well-capitalised banks would not have been subjected to any additional
constraint.13 But, it is possible that, through the e¤ects of capital requirements on market
discipline, the introduction of xed capital standards led to an increase in target capital
rates for both highly capitalised and weakly capitalised banks. In this event, Furlongs
ndings might be seen as consistent with Kim and Santomeros ndings.
This work has been criticized for not controlling for many variables which could have
a¤ected risk-taking behavior during that sample period. Also, it hasnt taken into account
12This was even before the introduction of the Basel I accord which was adopted by the G10 countries in
1988.
13 i.e., although capital requirements with di¤erentiated weights will probably give banks an incentive to
shift towards lowly-weighted asset categories, for any category of assets which bear the same proportional
capital charge, banks will shift towards the more risky assets in the category, which will end up increasing
risk-taking behaviour in the banking system.
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the endogeneity of capital ratio and risk. This has motivated the emergence of a new
set of studies. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) built a simultaneous equation model to take into
account the fact that changes in both capital and risk have endogenous as well as exogenous
components, and to focus on the determination of discretionary changes in risk which are
induced by either endogenous or exogenous changes in capital. They then investigated
the relationship between changes in risk and capital in a large sample of US banks over the
period 1983-1987, and found a positive association between changes in risk and capital.14 In
fact, their results established that risk exposure and capital levels are simultaneously related,
and that the majority of banks mitigate the e¤ects of increases in capital levels by increasing
asset risk posture, and vice versa. They argued that the fact that these relationships
were present even in banks which were in excess of the minimum regulatory requirements
for capital adequacy, supports the conclusion that a positive association between risk and
capital in such banks is not strictly the result of regulatory inuence, but rather reects the
view that risk-taking behavior tends to be constrained by bank ownersand/or managers
private incentives. Their ndings suggest then that capital standard tends to increase the
risk in the US banking system.
A partial conclusion at this stage is that taking into account the endogenous part of an
increase in capital and risk can make a huge di¤erence to the results. But this conclusion
will not be entirely fair, since the sample period and banks are slightly di¤erent and the
measures used to assess risks in banks are also di¤erent. Besides, when Jacques and Nigro
used the same empirical methodology on a di¤erent sample period, they obtained a di¤erent
result. In fact, Jacques and Nigro (1997) studied the impact of risk-based capital standards
on capital ratio and risk is the US banks under the period 1990-91 and found that changes
in the capital ratio and risk are negatively related, i.e., an increase in the level of capital
reduces the risk taken by US banks.15
The implicit-risk method failed then to close the debate about the e¤ectivity of capital
standard for banking stability in the US banking system. To end this subsection, let us
review the Dahl and Spivey (1995) paper which provides an indirect way of assessing the
importance of capital standard on banking stability. They used US bank data over the
period 1980-88 to assess the likelihood and timing of bank recovery from undercapitalization.
14Where risk is measured using the gross non-performing loans as percentage of total assets, and banks
capital ratio is the ratio of capital to total assets.
15The conicting empirical ndings on the e¤ect of capital standard on banking stability is conrmed by
the study of Haubrich and Watchel (1993) which found that the implementation of the Basle risk standards
caused poorly-capitalised banks to recongure their portfolios away from high-risk and towards low-risk
assets, and which runs contrary to that of Hancock and Wilcox (1992) who found out that, banks that had
less capital than required by the risk-based standards, shifted their portfolios towards high-risk assets.
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They noted that there appears to be only a limited capacity for banks to change positions
of undercapitalisation by growth limitations or dividend restrictions, and that the impact of
protability on recovery is greater the longer a bank remains undercapitalised. Hence, the
design of the capital requirement has important implications not only for optimal capital
levels, but also for the level of risk and the safety and soundness of the banking system as
a whole.
5.1.2 Capital Standard and Stability in Other CountriesBanking Systems
Outside of the US, studies on the impact of capital adequacy requirement on banking
stability using the implicit-risk method are scarce. So far, we have found two studies on the
Switzerland banking system (Rime (2000), and Sheldon (2001)), a study on the group of
ten member countries of the Basel committee (Sheldon (1996)) and a study on the Indian
banking system (Nachane et al. (2000)).
Using a modied version of the Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Rime (2001) built a simulta-
neous equations model to analyze adjustments in capital and risk in Swiss banks and found
that regulatory pressure to implement capital adequacy requirement induced banks to in-
crease their capital ratio but did not a¤ect the level of risk. In his study, risk is measured by
the ratio of risk-weighted earnings to total assets. He argued that his ndings indicate that
for Swiss banks, an increase in available capital through retained earnings or equity issues
is less costly than a downward adjustment in the risk of the portfolio, and that a rationale
for this can be the absence of a developed market for asset-backed securities in Switzerland.
However, this runs contrary to the result found by Sheldon (2001) on banks that operated
in Switzerland during the period 1987-99. He estimated the impact of the capital standard
on the probability of banksfailure and found that over this period the capital adequacy
requirement succeeded in increasing the bankssafety, although it decreased the protabil-
ity of banks, and nally that the level of adequacy requirement was too high from a welfare
point of view. As in the case of the US banking system the di¤erence in results can be due
to sample periods and the methodology used.
Nachane et al. (2000) provided an empirical assessment of the impact of capital adequacy
requirement on the risk-taking behavior of Indias commercial banks. Their study examined
27 Indian public sector banks using year-end data for 1998. Their measures of risk were:
the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets and the ratio of gross non-performing loans
to total assets. They found that banks adjusted their capital ratios signicantly, but their
risk positions adjusted relatively slowly to the respective target levels. They argued that
this suggests that changes in capital and risk are negatively related.
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Sheldon (1996) performed an analysis of the equity and asset volatilities of 219 banks
from the group of ten member countries of the Basel committee over the period 1987 to
1994. He found that bank asset volatility in the US banks rose and that this was the case
both for banks which increased their capital ratios and for those which did not. In Japan,
asset volatility fell, although most banks raised their capital ratios. He concluded that he
found little evidence that the implementation of the Basel guidelines had a risk-increasing
impact on bank portfolios.
5.1.3 Other Regulations and Banking Stability
In the literature of implicit-risk there are few studies about the impact of other types of
regulation on banking stability. There is a study of Horiuchi (1999) about the safety-net in
the Japanese banking system, two other studies on safety-net in cross-section analysis, and
two studies using a broad notion of regulation.
We have found one study of the Japanese government safety-net and its links with sta-
bility. It is the paper of Horiuchi (1999) which examines how the Japanese government
safety-net mechanism generated fragility in the banking system during the 1990s. He found
that even though the Japanese safety net protected depositors from losses associated with
bank failures, it did not implement prudential regulations to prevent moral hazard associ-
ated with it. The later translated into the systemic banking crisis that Japan experienced
during that period. This study therefore associated deposit insurance with banking crises
in Japan.
Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2005) found a similar result using the volatility of credit to
the private sector as the proxy for risk in a cross-country analysis. More precisely, they
found that the decision to introduce deposit insurance increases the volatility of credit to
the private sector in countries with weak institutions. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)
also found a similar result about the association of deposit insurance with banking fragility.
They used bank-level data to study the e¤ect of deposit insurance on market discipline of
banks. They focused on the disciplinary role of interest rates and deposit growth and found
that market discipline is stronger in countries with better institutions, but that the presence
of generously designed deposit insurance is able to reduce its e¤ect signicantly, leading to
banking system fragility. Nier and Baumann (2006) found the same result using bank-based
data that government safety nets result in lower capital bu¤ers and that stronger market
discipline resulting from uninsured liabilities and disclosure results in larger capital bu¤ers,
all else equal,. In other words, the deposit insurance is less important for banking stability
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than market-discipline.16
Some studies used a broad notion of regulation. These dened an index of banking
regulation as a weighted average of many types of regulation. For example, Gonzalez (2005)
provided a channel through which banking regulation a¤ects banking stability: charter
value. The study used a panel database of 251 banks in 36 countries to analyze the impact
of bank regulations on bank charter value and risk-taking. He found, after controlling for
the presence of deposit insurance and for the quality of a countrys contracting environment,
that regulatory restrictions increase banksrisk-taking incentives by reducing their charter
value. More precisely, banks in countries with stricter regulation have a lower charter value,
which increases their incentives to follow risky policies. In other words, there is a negative
relationship between regulatory restrictions and the stability of banking systems. He also
found that the deposit insurance can have a positive e¤ect on stability if it is exogenous,
but if it is endogenous, it is not relevant for stabilization purposes. Gonzalez used non-
performing loans to total loans and bank stock price volatility as the measure of risk in
banks.
Also, viewing bank concentration as a symptom of regulatory restriction, Evrensel (2007)
applied non-parametric and parametric methods of survival analysis to study the impact of
bank concentration on banking crises. The empirical results suggest that concentration in
the banking sector increases the survival time. In other words, it reduces the probability
of bank failure. Another result is that the G10 and non   G10 countries constitute two
distinct groups of countries, where the non G10 countries have a higher incidence of bank
crises.17 The parametric survival time regressions conrmed the possibility that the e¤ects
of the covariates on bank crises may have di¤erent dynamics in the G10 and non   G10
countries. The study states that the di¤erent dynamics associated with banking crises in
developed and developing countries seem to be related to the absence of competitive forces
in the economic and political environment.
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2006) studied whether compliance with the
Basel Core Principles for e¤ective banking supervision (BCP ) improves bank soundness.
They argued that BCP compliance assessments provide a unique source of information
about the quality of bank supervision and regulation around the world. They found a
16This result about a positive association of deposit insurance and banking instability was found as a
byproduct of their research on market discipline. Nier and Baumann (2006) found, using a cross-country
panel data set consisting of observations on 729 individual banks from 32 countries over the years 1993 to
2003, that competition leads to greater risk.
17The G10 refers to the group of eleven countries member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
More precisely, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
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signicant and positive relationship between bank soundness (measured with Moodys -
nancial strength ratings) and compliance with principles related to information provision.
Specically, they found that countries, which require banks to report their nancial data
regularly and accurately to regulators and market participants, have sounder banks. They
found similar results when the soundness was measured through z   scores yields. They
interpreted their ndings as evidence that transparency makes supervisory processes e¤ec-
tive, strengthening market discipline, and that it is the most important element of the core
principles.
The general result found in the implicit-risk literature about the relationship between
capital standard and stability is that the previous implementation of capital requirement
before the Basel II Accord had not shown convincingly that it has any e¤ect in ghting
risk-taking in the banking sector. This had motivated regulators to introduce the Basel II
capital standard. So far no empirical assessment of the impact of the Basel II Accord on
risk-taking in banking have been found in the literature. It will take some time to be able
to carry out a good study on this new accord. This time may even be longer than usual,
since the introduction of Basel II in the US has been coupled with a banking crisis.18 A key
issue one should take into account should be the endogenous part of the level of the capital
ratio.
Apart from the capital standard, other types of regulation have not been scrutinized
by many authors. Their ndings however show that regulation directly a¤ecting the bank
managers and/or owners behavior (excluding full deposit insurance) seems e¤ective for
stabilization purpose. However, one cannot conclude strongly whether the empirical ndings
presented in this section are robust, since we have only a few studies. Therefore, these
regulations need additional empirical scrutiny.
However, the implicit-risk method will always bring controversy as some would argue
that the measure of the risk which is taken into account is not the one which matters for
stability.
5.2 Explicit-Risk Method
A recent and growing literature of the empirical studies on banking regulation and stability
using an explicit measure of banking instability departs from the work of DKD98. These
studies use cross-country data on banking regulation and banking crises to assess, using a
discrete variable regression model such as the logit or the probit model, if a given regulatory
18This crisis caused by the subprime loans for housing cannot be accounted for as a consequence of Basel II;
more reasonably, it can be viewed as an evidence of the weakness of the Basel I Accord on capital standard.
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measure has successfully contained or reduced the probability of the occurrence of a banking
crisis in a given set of economies. Some studies use all countries with available data, while
others focus on a group of countries such as developing countries, developed countries, etc.
Generally, these studies are motivated by the conicting theoretical results of the e¤ect
of regulation on the banking system stability. However, the most important reason for the
increase in empirical research on regulation and stability seems to be the availability of
data. Since 1998, a group of researchers at the World Bank : Barth, Caprio, Levine, and
others have developed a comprehensive survey of the banking regulation practices around
the world. From the rst survey in 1998-1999 to the third survey in 2007, the number of
countries covered has increased signicantly from 100 to almost every country in the world.
The number of questions and types of regulation practices covered by these surveys have
also increased over this period. They have also assembled a database on banking crises.
Many studies have used these datasets to answer di¤erent types of questions, ranging
from the e¤ect of entry restriction on banking stability, to the e¤ect of deposit insurance,
capital adequacy requirement, and a broad range of criteria in banking regulation.
5.2.1 Banking Entry Restriction
A key question which has earned empirical scrutiny is whether {a lower level of} entry
restriction into the banking system is likely to increase the stability of the banking sector.
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) provided an empirical answer to this question.
They used data for 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, and applied the DKD98 discrete
regression model. They found that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated
banking systems. Moreover, the data showed that regulations that thwart competition
are linked with greater banking system fragility. Furthermore, Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2004) found that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is positively associated with
greater limitations on foreign bank entry; and they found no evidence of positive association
between domestic entry restrictions and banking stability.
But before all this research Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) have provided the
rst empirical assessment of the link between lower entry restriction in banking and nancial
fragility using a dummy variable of banking crises. Their study used a panel of data of 53
countries over the period 1980-1995. They found that banking crises were more likely
to occur in countries with more liberalized nancial systems. They pointed out that the
nancial liberalizations impact on a fragile banking sector is weaker in countries with strong
institutionsespecially where there is respect for the rule of law, a low level of corruption, and
good contract enforcement. They also found that even in the presence of macroeconomic
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stabilization, less entry restriction is likely to be linked with the occurrence of banking
crises in countries where institutions to ensure legal behaviour, contract enforcement, and
e¤ective prudential regulation and supervision are not fully developed.
Conversely, Noy (2004) found a di¤erent result when studying the e¤ect of liberalization
on banking stability. He examined the hypothesis that insu¢ cient prudential supervision
of the banking sector after the removal of entry restriction results in excessive risk-taking
by nancial intermediaries and a subsequent crisis. The paper evaluated the empirical
validity of this hypothesis using a panel-probit model of the occurrence of banking crises
controlling for macro-economic, institutional and political variables. It concluded that such
a development is, at worst, only a medium run threat to the health of the banking sector. He
found that a more direct danger is the loss of monopoly power that liberalization typically
entails.
5.2.2 Capital Standard
So far we have found in the literature only one study of the impact of capital standard on
banking stability using the explicit-risk method. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found
a signicant negative relationship between higher ratio of capital requirement and non-
performing loans. However, when they used the explicit dummy variable for banking crises,
they found some specications in which capital requirement entered with a negative and
signicant coe¢ cient. They interpreted this result as evidence that the relationship between
capital adequacy requirement and banking stability is not very robust.
5.2.3 Deposit Insurance
Before the important empirical research of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), here-
after DKD02, there was a large body of theoretical literature on deposit insurance and its
association to fragility. However, there was a large divergence in the results of these stud-
ies too. DKD02 used cross-country panel data on 61 countries over the period 1980-1997
and found that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises,
the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment
is weak. They also found that the negative e¤ect of deposit insurance on banksstability
is stronger the more extensive is the coverage o¤ered to depositors, where the scheme is
funded, and where it is run by the government. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) found a
positive association between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and the bank
fragility. Their relationship was robust to alterations in the control variables. This was
consistent with the view that deposit insurance not only substantially aggravates moral
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hazard but also produces deleterious e¤ects on banking stability.
However this result has not been found to be robust by Arteta and Eichengreen (2006).
In fact, they assessed the link between banking fragility and deposit insurance using a sample
of 75 emerging market economies over the period 1975-1997 and found no signicant e¤ect of
deposit insurance on the probability of the banking system being in a systemic crisis. They
argued that what led to this di¤erence was that they had more data on deposit insurance
on emerging market than DKD02.
5.2.4 Overall Banking Regulation
Using the above databases some studies such as: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000, 2004,
2006), and Barth, Gan, and Nolle (2006) have assessed the stabilization e¤ect of existing
banking regulations.
In a book entitled "Rethinking Banking Regulation: Till Angels Governbased on the
World Bank survey, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) assessed the importance of each type
of regulatory policy on the stabilization of the banking system. They provided empirical
results for a range of regulations. They found that regulation is not e¤ective for stability,
and for a long range of criteria. They argued for paying closer attention to the foundations
of the nancial sector, and that without good information and adequate incentives, market
participants will not be able to e¤ectively monitor banks. These ndings are the summary of
ndings already done in one of their previous works: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). In
this work they used their database on bank regulation and supervision covering 107 countries
to assess the relationship between specic regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-
sector development, e¢ ciency, and fragility. More precisely, they examined the e¤ect on
banking stability of regulations such as: restrictions on bank activities; entry restriction;
capital adequacy requirement; deposit insurance system design features; supervisory power,
independence, and resources; loan classication stringency, provisioning standards, and
diversication guidelines; regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector
monitoring of banks; and government ownership. They found that regulatory measures
that rely excessively on direct government restriction on bank activities is not good for
stability and can even create fragility. More precisely, they found that the relationship
between capital adequacy requirement and banking stability is not robust. They also found
that regulatory policies that rely on guidelines that force accurate information disclosure,
empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and foster incentives for private agents
to exert corporate control, worked best to promote stability.
They argued that their ndings do not mean that regulations which have not been proven
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e¤ective have no role in strengthening the banking sector. Rather, their interpretation is
that it suggested a supporting role for regulation, one in which the regulators job is to
verify that the information being disclosed by banks is accurate, and to penalize banks that
disclose false, misleading or inadequate information.
Furthermore, Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) found, using cross-section data on twin bank-
ing crises and controlling for institutional factors, mixed evidence that deposit insurance,
the removal of capital controls, a lack of central bank independence, and nancial liberaliza-
tion increase the chance of banking crises.19 Using cross-country data on bank ownership,
regulation and supervision, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000) investigated the link between
bank ownership and regulation on banking fragility. They found that the tighter the restric-
tions placed on this activity (a bank is not permitted to do securities, insurance and real
estate activities), on average, the more ine¢ cient are banks and the greater the likelihood
of a banking crisis. The likelihood of a banking crisis is also greater, on average, the tighter
the restrictions placed on bank ownership of non-nancial rms. They also found that re-
stricting the mixing of banking and commerce is associated with greater nancial fragility.
Whereas restricting non-nancial rms from owning commercial banks is not associated
with nancial fragility, restricting banks from owning non-nancial rms is positively asso-
ciated with bank instability. Finally, countries that restrict banks from owning non-nancial
rms have a robustly higher probability of su¤ering a major banking crisis.
It follows from the empirical studies, using explicit measures of banking crises, that
regulations a¤ecting a banks balance sheet or the banking sector structure are generally
at least not e¤ective for stabilization purposes, and can even increase the fragility of the
banking system. Conversely, regulation a¤ecting a bank managersand/or ownersbehavior
is e¤ective. The importance of taking the institutional factors into account has emerged as
these factors are often linked with instability.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The empirical literature on banking regulation has so far tried to solve the theoretically con-
icting results on banking regulatios and banking stability. It has taken two main directions
in respect of the stability measure which is used in the study. The so called implicit-stability
method uses an implicit measure of risk such as: the ratio of non-performing loan on the
total asset, bank stock price volatility, and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets;
while the explicit-stability method uses the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis in a
19Their dataset consists of over 30 countries covering 13 institutional factors for the period 1984-2002.
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given economy as the measure of instability.
These two methods di¤er also in terms of econometric techniques that they use for
their estimations. The implicit-stability method relies mainly on a simultaneous equation
model, and on a survival and/or hazard model; while the explicit-stability method relies on
a discrete regression model such as logit or probit in the context of panel data.
So far, many studies have been done on the US banking system but only few on other
banking systems. Most importantly, many works focus on a given type of regulation, gen-
erally on the capital adequacy requirement, deposit insurance, entry restriction, and super-
vision practices in the banking sector. So far, also these studies have failed to provide a
convincing result about the impact of many types of regulation on banking stability. No
regulation assessed so far had been found by all the empirical studies done on it to present
the same result about its e¤ect on stability. Hence, instead of providing a solution of the
conicting theoretical ndings, empirical studies add confusion to them.
These conicting results are mostly due to the methodologies used. In fact, even for
studies using the implicit-instability technique, the results on banking regulation and in-
stability vary from studies using simultaneous equation models to those using hazard or
survival models. They vary also in the function of the control variable used to account
for the characteristics of the banking system, and nally on the sample periods or sample
countries. The di¤erence between the simultaneous equations model and the others may be
that the former takes into account the endogeneity e¤ect of some types of regulation.
For studies using a cross-section dummy variable of systemic banking crises as the mea-
sure of the banking stability, the result is generally not robust, showing that regulations such
as entry restriction and capital requirement have no signicant e¤ect on stability. These
studies su¤er mainly from selection bias, which comes from the method used to build the
banking crisis variable. In fact, as pointed out by von-Hagen and Ho (2007), all datasets on
the banking crises variable identify a crisis year using a combination of market events such
as closures, merges, runs on nancial institutions, and government emergency measures such
as a freeze. Hence, they identify crises only when they are severe enough to trigger market
events. In contrast, crises successfully contained by corrective policies are neglected.
There is a need to nd a good measure of banking stability in order to assess the
importance of regulation on stability. The measure of banking instability can be constructed
using banking system indicators which are positively correlated to banking crises, such as
the growth of credit to the private sector, and the growth of banksdeposits.20 Thereafter,
one can use methods such as the Markov-switching model, suitable for modelling changes
20See, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2007)
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in the state of a variable, to detect banking crises episodes.
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